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Difficulties with Sharing: A Proposal to Define the 
Voluntary Unit and Protect the Rights of Surface Co-
Owners and Mineral Servitude Holders in Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
“It’s always more fun to share with everyone.”1 This sentiment, 
although nice in a children’s song, does not always hold true in the 
real world. Because co-ownership is frequently inconvenient, 
Louisiana avoids friction between co-owners by allowing them to 
divide the co-owned thing into separately owned portions or sell 
the thing and divide the proceeds.2 However, these options to 
partition the co-owned thing may not always be ideal or available, 
such as when the co-owned thing is burdened by a separately 
owned right that cannot be partitioned.3 Accordingly, difficulties 
with sharing may leave squabbling co-owners without a suitable 
remedy and potentially clueless as to their rights as co-owners. 
Consider the following co-ownership scenario in a mineral law 
context. 
On January 1, 1997, Farmer Joe created a mineral servitude by 
selling the mineral rights on his 1,000-acre tract of land in DeSoto 
Parish to Big City Bob.4 This mineral servitude vests Bob with the 
right to explore for minerals on the burdened land.5 Bob’s 
servitude will expire, and his mineral rights will revert back to Joe, 
if Bob does not use the servitude within ten years of its creation.6 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by W. DREW BURNHAM. 
 1. JACK JOHNSON, The Sharing Song, on SING-A-LONGS AND LULLABIES 
FOR THE FILM CURIOUS GEORGE (Brushfire Records 2006). 
 2. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE art. 747 
(2012) (discussing servitudes in general); see infra Part I.C. 
 4. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2000); see also Frost-Johnson 
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922).  
 5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000) (“A mineral servitude is the 
right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for 
and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”).  
 6. See id. § 31:27(1) (listing “prescription resulting from nonuse for ten 
years” as a method of extinguishing a mineral servitude); see also id. § 31:29 
(“The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral servitude is interrupted 
by good faith operations for the discovery and production of minerals.”); id. § 
31:29 cmt. (noting that dry holes may constitute good faith operations); id. § 
31:44 (stating that the adoption of operations by another may interrupt 
prescription); id. § 31:33 (defining unit operations that can affect prescription on 
the servitude); id. § 31:36 (stating that production on the tract will interrupt 
prescription on the servitude); id. § 31:54 (declaring that a proper 
acknowledgment will interrupt prescription on a servitude). 
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Farmer Joe passes away in 1999, leaving his ten children in 
equal co-ownership of the tract of land burdened by Bob’s 
servitude.7 One of those children, Mike, purchases all but one of 
his siblings’ interests in the property, leaving his sister, Kate, as a 
co-owner of 10% of the property.8 In 2006, an oil and gas 
prospector, Black Gold Drilling, enters the picture. Wanting to 
exploit the up-and-coming Haynesville Shale in northwest 
Louisiana quickly and cheaply, Black Gold seeks to form a 
voluntary unit that would include Mike’s interests. Such a unit is a 
contractual agreement by which a group of mineral rights owners, 
land owners, and other parties agree to participate in the costs and 
revenue of mineral exploration in a defined area.9 
Bob, the mineral servitude owner, and Mike, the 90% co-owner 
of the surface, sign onto the voluntary unit. Bob sees his 
involvement in the voluntary unit as an opportunity to share in 
revenue, interrupt the running of prescription against his servitude, 
and avoid the expense of drilling individually on his servitude 
tract. Mike sees the voluntary unitization as an opportunity to 
receive some compensation for his consent.10 If Mike did not 
consent, Bob may individually drill on his servitude, in which case 
Mike would not recover any compensation and would go through 
the inconvenience of having a well drilled on the surface of his 
property. On the other hand, Kate, the 10% owner of the surface, 
thinks that prescription will fully accrue against Bob’s servitude 
before any drilling occurs that would interrupt prescription; thus, 
Kate refuses to consent to the voluntary unit, expecting that the 
mineral rights will revert back to her surface ownership.11  
In December 2006, Black Gold, as the operator of the 
voluntary unit, drills a producing well on land outside the surface 
                                                                                                             
 7. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 880 (2012). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Patrick S. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization in Louisiana, 49 ANN. 
INST. ON MIN. L. 21, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Ottinger, Conventional Unitization] 
(“Unitization is the allocation of designated acreage to a well for purposes of 
development, cost-sharing and allocation of production.”). As opposed to 
compulsory unitization, conventional unitization is a contractual pooling of 
ownership rights in a defined area for purposes of production in that area. Id. at 
42. A unit agreement is a contract agreed to between the consenting parties to be 
affected by the unitization and the agreement forms a voluntary unit. Id. at 42–
45. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000). As a co-owner, Kate may 
partition the land that she co-owns with Mike, but such a partition will not affect 
the servitude burdening her property. The servitude will remain intact. See infra 
Part I.C. 
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owned by Kate and Mike but within the unit area.12 As a result of 
such drilling, prescription running on a mineral right in the unit 
will generally be interrupted.13 The prescription that accrued 
against Bob’s servitude since 1997 appears to be interrupted by 
Black Gold’s drilling.14 However, on January 2, 2007, Kate claims 
that Bob’s servitude has expired, and that the mineral rights have 
reverted back to the surface owners. Kate asserts that unit 
production did not interrupt prescription on Bob’s mineral 
servitude because her consent to the voluntary unit agreement was 
necessary for the unit to have affected her interests.15  
Neither the Mineral Code nor Louisiana jurisprudence furnishes 
a definitive answer to the question of whether prescription is 
interrupted and, if so, to what extent prescription is interrupted on 
the non-drill site tract by a voluntary unit to which the surface co-
owner did not consent. This gap poses significant problems for oil 
and gas operators, surface co-owners, and owners of mineral rights. 
Uncertainty surrounding the formation and effect of voluntary units 
makes this relatively cheap and quick method of unitization too 
unpredictable for widespread use by operators, causing them to opt 
for the more expensive and time-consuming process of seeking a 
compulsory unitization.16 Misunderstandings of how non-consenting 
surface co-owners are affected by voluntary unitizations may 
produce flaws in chains of title regarding mineral rights and leases. 
                                                                                                             
 12. Production from a unit well on a tract burdened by a servitude will 
cause prescription accruing against the servitude to be interrupted. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000). If the well is off-tract, the prescription will only 
occur for that portion of the burdened land that is included in the unit. Id. The 
same rule exists for mineral royalties. Id. § 31:89. For exceptions to this general 
rule, see discussion infra Part I.D. 
 13. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000); id. § 31:89. 
 14. See id. § 31:29. 
 15. See Alexander v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532, 536–37 (La. Ct. App. 1959) 
(stating that inclusion of servitude acreage in a conventional unitization by the 
servitude owners was not effective to interrupt prescription without landowner 
consent because the servitude owner was powerless to extend the life of the 
servitude without the clear consent of the landowner burdened by the servitude); 
see also John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under 
the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 775 (1976). 
 16. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 25–26. Compulsory 
unitization is accomplished through applications to, hearings with, and a 
favorable order from the Louisiana Office of Conservation. Even if “fast 
tracked” to avoid imminent lease expirations and mineral right prescription, this 
process takes no less than 70 days. Id. at 25 n.23. Significant costs are associated 
with preparing and filing applications for compulsory unit orders with the Office 
of Conservation, costs that may be substantially less if a conventional unit route 
is selected. Id. at 26.  
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These flaws will vitiate the consent of those who mistakenly 
appeared to possess mineral rights and potentially cause millions 
of dollars of investment in unit development, production payments, 
and lease acquisition to be wasted. Additionally, surface co-owners 
may be entitled to a reversion of the mineral rights previously held 
in servitudes or royalties back to their ownership. 
From a synthesis of relevant Louisiana Civil Code and Mineral 
Code articles, three principal remedial options appear to be 
available to a court facing this scenario. First, the court could rule 
that the voluntary unitization does not affect those who do not 
consent to it, and thus, the servitude is not interrupted to any extent. 
Second, the court could conclude, using a principle found in 
conducting operations on mineral servitudes and leases, that a 
substantial majority of surface co-owners may encumber the surface 
through a voluntary unit without the consent of the minority co-
owners. Third, the court could find that the most equitable solution 
is to proportionally prescribe the servitude interests to the 
percentage of surface co-owner consent obtained to the voluntary 
unitization. However, these solutions are neither equitable between 
the parties nor clearly consistent with existing Louisiana law.17 
Accordingly, amendments to the Mineral Code are necessary to 
define the voluntary unit and dictate how a non-consenting co-
owner is affected by a voluntary unitization that lacked his or her 
consent.18 These necessary changes are needed quickly so as to 
avoid unnecessary waste and delay in mineral development and to 
incentivize exploration through the use of the relatively cheap and 
speedy alternative to compulsory unitsvoluntary units. 
This Comment proposes a solution to the pressing question of 
whether a surface co-owner can be burdened by a voluntary 
unitization to which he or she did not consent. Part I gives a brief 
explanation of how mineral rights are formed in Louisiana, the 
nature of the mineral servitude, co-ownership principles, and unit 
formation. Part II explores three potential remedies derived from 
existing law that a court may apply to the issue presented. Part III 
proposes two revisions to the Mineral Code—clear definitions of 
the voluntary unit and its effects. If adopted, these modest 
clarifications of existing law would ensure the ideal outcome to the 
current issue: a solution that provides an equitable remedy for 
surface co-owners, mineral servitude holders, and oil and gas 
operators alike. 
                                                                                                             
 17. See discussion infra Part II. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III. 
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I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL AND CO-
OWNERSHIP LAW 
Several tenets of Louisiana mineral law and principles of co-
ownership interconnect to lead to the current ambiguity of whether 
drilling from a voluntary unit can interrupt prescription accruing 
against a servitude that burdens a non-consenting surface co-
owner’s tract. These interrelated principles include the nature of 
mineral servitudes, co-ownership, and unitization. 
A. The Separation of Mineral Rights from the Land 
Louisiana adopts a non-ownership theory regarding subsurface 
migratory, or non-solid, minerals.19 This means that the oil and gas 
that may be below the surface of an owner’s land is not owned 
until extracted and possessed.20 In the foundational case of Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court found that there is no ownership of minerals until those 
minerals are removed from the ground and physically possessed.21 
This result was later codified in the Louisiana Mineral Code.22 
Rather than retain ownership before possession, the landowner is 
vested only with the right to explore for and extract migratory 
minerals, like oil and gas.23  
The landowner may separate this right of mineral exploration 
from the land in whole or in part.24 The fundamental mineral rights 
created by landowners in Louisiana are the mineral servitude,25 
                                                                                                             
 19. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (2000); 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL 
AND GAS LAW § 216.1 (2012). 
 20. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (2000); see, e.g., Frost-Johnson 
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922) (“We may hold, and 
we do hold, that no matter what the intention of the parties be, the owner of 
lands cannot convey or reserve the ownership of the oils, gases, and waters 
therein apart from the land in which they lie; and we so hold, because the owner 
himself has no absolute property in such oils, gases, and waters, but only the 
right to draw them through the soil and thereby become the owner of them.”). 
 21. Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 243. 
 22. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:6–7 (2000). 
 23. See Id. § 31:8; Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 243. Mineral rights are real 
rights. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2000). 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:15 (2000). 
 25. See id. § 31:21 (“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land 
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals 
and reducing them to possession and ownership.”). 
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mineral royalty,26 and mineral lease.27 Louisiana’s civilian tradition 
dictates that the sale of the right to explore for minerals does not 
create a permanent separation of the mineral right from the land like 
in the case of the mineral estate in common law jurisdictions but, 
rather, a real right that burdens a tract of land unless left unused for 
a certain period.28 This Comment focuses on the mineral servitude. 
B. The Mineral Servitude 
“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land 
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and 
producing minerals and reducing them to possession and 
ownership.”29 The mineral servitude exists as a burden upon the 
land from which it is derived.30 Though functioning in a manner 
similar to a predial servitude,31 the mineral servitude is best 
categorized as a limited personal servitude.32 The mineral servitude 
may be granted only by the landowner who possesses the right to 
explore for and produce minerals at the time of the mineral 
servitude’s creation.33 The rights of the servitude owner may be 
contractually limited or subjected to more onerous requirements 
                                                                                                             
 26. See id. § 31:80 (“A mineral royalty is the right to participate in 
production of minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral 
servitude owned by another.”). 
 27. See id. § 31:114 (“A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is 
granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.”). 
 28. Id. § 31:16. See Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 667–69 
(La. 1923) (“[W]e therefore conclude that there is in this state no such estate in 
lands as a corporeal ‘mineral estate,’ distinct from and independent of the 
surface estate; that the so-called ‘mineral estate’ by whatever term described, or 
however, acquired or reserved, is a mere servitude upon the land in which the 
minerals lie, giving only the right to extract such minerals and appropriate 
them.”). 
 29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000). 
 30. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 44 ANN. INST. 
ON MIN. L. 68, 75 (1997) [hereinafter Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude] (quoting 
Steele v. Denning, 456 So. 2d 992, 998 (La. 1984)). 
 31. The mineral servitude is theoretically distinct from the predial servitude 
in that there is no dominant estate in the case of the mineral servitude, only a 
servient one. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 1:9, in 4 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013). 
 32. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 
1097, 1099 (1987). 
 33. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:24 (2000); McDougal, supra note 32, at 
1101; Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 77–78. If the right of 
the landowner is conditional or subject to resolution, the servitude created by 
that landowner will expire concurrently with the right of the landowner to create 
the servitude. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:25 (2000). 
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for prescription interruption, but the contractual terms may not 
circumvent the minimum standards provided by law.34 
A mineral servitude can be extinguished in many ways: by the 
prescription of nonuse of ten years,35 confusion,36 renunciation of 
the servitude,37 expiration of the time contractually granted for the 
existence of the servitude,38 occurrence of a dissolving condition 
imposed upon the servitude,39 or extinction of the right of the 
grantor of the servitude.40 The prescription of nonuse is the most 
relevant for the current analysis because, as seen in the 
hypothetical, the issue posed by Kate’s non-consent to the 
voluntary unit is whether Black Gold’s drilling upon the unit will 
constitute a use that interrupts the prescription accruing against 
Bob’s servitude. 
The prescription of nonuse for mineral servitudes is derived 
from the civilian concept that real rights other than ownership are 
subject to the prescription of nonuse.41 The Mineral Code states 
that these mineral rights are subject to a prescriptive period of ten 
years.42 Prescription begins to accrue on the day that the servitude is 
created.43 Thus, a mineral servitude will terminate after ten years of 
nonuse by the servitude holder; however, this accrual of prescription 
                                                                                                             
 34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:74–75 (2000) (“The rules of use 
regarding interruption of prescription on a mineral servitude may be restricted 
by agreement but may not be made less burdensome, except that parties may 
agree expressly and in writing, either in the act creating a servitude or otherwise, 
that an interruption of prescription resulting from unit operations or production 
shall extend to the entirety of the tract burdened by the servitude tract regardless 
of the location of the well or of whether all or only part of the tract is included in 
the unit.”); see also McDougal, supra note 32, at 1114. 
 35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000). 
 36. See id. § 31:27(2). For a functionally similar provision, see La. CIV. 
CODE art. 765 (2012) (“A predial servitude is extinguished when the dominant 
and the servient estates are acquired in their entirety by the same person.”). 
However, the owner of land can be a co-owner of a mineral servitude burdening 
his property without causing “confusion.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:66–67 
(2000). See generally Allied Chem. Corp. v. Dye, 441 So. 2d 776 (La. Ct. App. 
1983); Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, Developments in the Law, 1983-84, 45 
LA. L. REV. 433, 442 (1984). 
 37. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(3) (2000); see generally Harmon v. 
Whitten, 390 So. 2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 38. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(4) (2000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 31:27(5).  
 41. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3448 (2012). 
 42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000). 
 43. Id. § 31:28. 
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may be interrupted44 or suspended.45 Additionally, a mineral 
servitude may also be extended by the landowner’s consent.46 
This Comment primarily concerns two similar methods of 
interruption: good faith drilling and production. Good faith drilling 
is an exploratory operation that does not result in the production of 
minerals but constitutes a genuine effort to do so.47 Drilling that 
leads to the production of minerals also interrupts prescription 
accruing against a servitude.48 Good faith drilling or production in a 
conventional or compulsory unit49 whose unit area overlaps with the 
land burdened by a servitude also interrupts prescription accruing 
against that servitude.50 If the unit well is off-tract (i.e., the location 
of drilling is not positioned on the tract of the burdened 
landowner), prescription will be interrupted only for the portion of 
the servitude encompassed within the unit area.51 If the unit well is 
                                                                                                             
 44. See id. §§ 31:29–57. An interruption causes the time that has accrued to 
be erased and time begins to accrue anew upon the end of the interrupting event 
or condition. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3466 (2012). 
 45. A suspension is a period of time where the servitude cannot be used. 
Prescriptive time does not accrue against the servitude during the period, but the 
time already accrued against the servitude prior to the suspensive condition is 
not erased by the suspending event. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:58–61 
(2000); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3472 (2012); see also Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 440 
So. 2d 93, 97 n.8 (La. 1983) (“The basic difference between interruption and 
suspension of prescription is the length of the prescriptive period when 
prescription begins to run anew.”). 
 46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:56 (2000). An extension occurs when a 
landowner expressly, in a writing filed for registry, extends the life of the 
servitude beyond the servitude date for a defined period. McDougal, supra note 
32, at 1156–57. This defined period logically must be less than the period that 
would result from an interruption, as law prevents a prescriptive period longer than 
ten years, and a ten-year “extension” would function as an acknowledgement. Id. 
 47. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:29 (2000) (“The prescription of nonuse 
running against a mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for 
the discovery and production of minerals. By good faith is meant that the 
operations must be (1) commenced with reasonable expectation of discovering 
and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point or depth, (2) 
continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and (3) conducted in such a 
manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or mining 
is not conducted at all times.”). For a discussion on “good faith drilling,” see 
Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 37 So. 3d 1122, 1129–31 (La. 
Ct. App. 2010), and Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene, 437 So. 2d 940 
(La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 48. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:36 (2000). 
 49. See infra Part I.D. 
 50. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). 
 51. Id. §§ 31:33–37. One instance of a limited opportunity for “freedom of 
contract” may occur when the landowner and the servitude owner contract for an 
interruption to the portion of the servitude outside the unit area. See LA. REV. 
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on the tract burdened by the servitude, interruption occurs for the 
whole of the servitude, regardless of whether a portion of the 
servitude tract is outside the unit area.52 
The running of prescription of nonuse may also be interrupted by 
acknowledgment.53 Acknowledgment occurs when the landowner of 
the tract burdened by the servitude makes clear in writing that he or 
she intends to interrupt the running of prescription of the servitude 
for the party owning the servitude.54 To affect third parties, the 
acknowledgment must be filed for registry.55 The requirement that the 
landowner make the acknowledgment is a necessary consequence of 
the fact that only the landowner may burden the thing owned.56 The 
acknowledgment is an extension of the life of the servitude without 
the owner of the servitude engaging in activity that would constitute 
a “use” of the servitude.57 However, obtaining the consent of surface 
owners to further encumber the land by means of an 
acknowledgement is complicated when the surface is owned in 
indivision, i.e., co-ownership.58 
C. Co-ownership 
Ownership of one thing by more than one person is ownership in 
indivision, also known as co-ownership.59 Land, as well as mineral 
rights,60 is susceptible of ownership in indivision.61 Though each 
co-owner possesses the right to use the co-owned thing,62 the 
                                                                                                             
 
STAT. ANN. § 31:75 (2000); Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 
53–54 (2002); see also Sandefer & Andress, Inc. v. Pruitt, 471 So. 2d 933, 937 
(La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 52. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33–37 (2000). 
 53. See id. § 31:54. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. § 31:54 cmt. 
 57. See id. § 31:54. 
 58. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 59. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2012). 
 60. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:168 (2000). 
 61. See Patrick S. Ottinger, “Oil in the Family”: Obtaining the Requisite 
Consent to Conduct Operations on Co-Owned Land or Mineral Servitudes, 73 
LA. L. REV. 745, 747 (2012) [hereinafter Ottinger, Oil in the Family]. 
 62. Each co-owner has the right to use the thing consistent with the 
“destination” of the property. LA. CIV. CODE art. 802 (2012). As applied to land, 
the term “destination” references the kind of uses of the land that landowners 
historically practice. Thomas A. Harrell, Problems Created by Coownership in 
Louisiana, 32 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 379, 386 n.13 (1985). 
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consent of all of the co-owners is required to alienate or encumber 
the entire co-owned thing.63  
Louisiana co-ownership law is rooted in the civilian tradition.64 
“Roman law recognized the concept of co-ownership as each co-
owner ‘possessing an abstract portion of the whole,’ or a portion of 
‘each molecule’ of the property held in common.”65 Because this 
joint ownership is of each and every part of the thing co-owned, 
the co-owner has a distinct right to participate in decisions 
regarding the encumbrance of that thing.66 The drafters of the 
Louisiana Civil Code adopted this principle, which can be 
distinctly seen in the creation of predial servitudes,67 and also in its 
close relative, the mineral servitude.68  
When conflicts arise between co-owners, the legally prescribed 
remedy is partition.69 Partition is the division of a co-owned thing 
into separate, independent things or the sale of the co-owned thing 
and division of the sale proceeds to the former co-owners.70 “The 
need to partition stems from the inconvenience of co-management, 
namely the requirement of unanimous consent . . . .”71 Partition is 
                                                                                                             
 63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012). Granting a mineral lease upon co-owned 
land or servitude is possible, but a lessee of certain co-owners may not drill 
upon the property without obtaining consent of co-owners with at least 80% of 
ownership in the co-owned thing. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (2000). 
 64. See Angela Jeanne Crowder, Mineral Rights: The Requirement of 
Consent Among Co-Owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931, 931–33 (1988). 
 65. Id. at 931. See also George Denègre, Comment, Ownership in Indivision 
in Louisiana, 22 TUL. L. REV. 611, 611 (1948). The rule in the Louisiana Civil 
Code requiring the consent of all co-owners to encumber the property is derived 
from the works of Roman commentators. See Crowder, supra note 64, at 931–
33. The rule represents a long-held policy in civil jurisdictions that the rights of 
one co-owner in a thing may not be adversely affected by the unilateral acts of 
another co-owner. See Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La. 
1919).  
 66. See Crowder, supra note 64. 
 67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 714 (2012) (“A predial servitude on an estate owned 
in indivision may be established only with the consent of all the co-owners. 
When a co-owner purports to establish a servitude on the entire estate, the 
contract is not null; but, its execution is suspended until the consent of all co-
owners is obtained.”). 
 68. Crowder, supra note 64, at 932. 
 69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2012) (“No one may be compelled to hold a 
thing in indivision with another unless the contrary has been provided by law or 
juridical act. Any co-owner has a right to demand partition of a thing held in 
indivision.”). 
 70. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 810–11 (2012). 
 71. Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., 625 So. 2d 477, 480 (La. 1993). 
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said to be a “favored” remedy by courts in Louisiana.72 Referencing 
the earlier hypothetical of siblings Mike and Kate, it would seem 
that the minority surface co-owner, Kate, could partition the land 
and avoid complications with the voluntary unit and the mineral 
servitude burdening her land. However, a partition accomplished 
between co-owners of land burdened by a mineral right, including a 
mineral servitude, will not divide the mineral right—a consequence 
of legal protections afforded third parties to the co-ownership.73 
Accordingly, in the hypothetical, the land owned in indivision may 
be partitioned between Mike and Kate, but the mineral servitude 
held by Bob could not be divided and the problem of whether 
Kate’s consent to the voluntary unit is necessary for the unit to 
affect her rights would remain unresolved. 
Prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code, the Louisiana Civil 
Code governed co-owner delegations of mineral rights.74 Louisiana 
courts consistently applied the rule that universal co-owner consent 
was necessary to encumber land or mineral rights subject in its 
entirety to co-ownership.75 The Mineral Code initially maintained 
the universal co-owner consent rule.76 However, in 1986, the 
general principle of universal co-owner consent was excepted, 
making full consent among land co-owners unnecessary in certain 
circumstances.77  
In 1986, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Mineral Code 
so that a small minority of co-owners of land or of a mineral 
servitude could not prevent the development of land for mineral 
production.78 Because exploration required the full consent of the 
co-owners, the former system allowed a small minority of co-owners 
                                                                                                             
 72. Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 752 (quoting Pasternack 
Holding, 625 So. 2d at 480). 
 73. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 747 (2012) (discussing division of a dominate 
estate subject to a servitude); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000) (“The 
division of a tract burdened by a mineral servitude does not divide the 
servitude.”); see generally Andrew L. Gates, III, Partition of Land and Mineral 
Rights, 43 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1132–41 (1983). 
 74. Crowder, supra note 64, at 932. 
 75. See Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462, 467 (La. 1938) 
(stating that mineral servitudes granted by less than all of the co-owners would 
not be null, but simply suspended until all consent is obtained. Though the 
servitude owner was not able to explore for and develop the land for production 
activities because of the lack of full consent, the servitude was still a valid 
mineral servitude); Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La. 1919); 
see also Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 749. 
 76. Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 762. 
 77. Id. at 761–64. 
 78. Act No. 1047, 1986 La. Acts 1964. 
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to force lessees of the majority of co-owners into disproportionately 
advantageous deals for the minority by withholding consent.79 This 
“shakedown” would seem to be the natural result of giving a co-
owner or a group of co-owners with a relatively small interest the 
ability to prevent exploitation of mineral rights without their consent. 
In a move inconsistent with civilian co-ownership principles,80 the 
revisions made by the Legislature to the Mineral Code in 1986 
enable co-owners of land to grant servitudes that could be exercised 
with only the consent of 90% of the co-owners.81 The 90% consent 
threshold was lowered to 80% in 1988.82 It was left unclear whether 
the new lower level of co-owner consent to the creation of 
servitudes would affect the formation and effects of unitization 
agreements—agreements that may affect both consenting and non-
consenting co-owners alike.83 
D. Unitization 
Unitization pools ownership interests in a defined area in order 
to encourage oil and gas development by the sharing of costs and 
the equitable division of production proceeds between the 
assembled acreage.84 There are two categories of unitization: 
compulsory and conventional.85 In Louisiana, the Commissioner of 
Conservation of the Department of Natural Resources is tasked 
with avoiding the waste of minerals and the drilling of unnecessary 
wells.86 To accomplish this end, the Commissioner may form 
compulsory units to pool the interests of land and mineral right 
owners in a defined geographic area.87 Compulsory units are 
typically granted through application and hearing processes that 
will likely be more expensive and time consuming than would be 
conventional unitization processes.88  
                                                                                                             
 79. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 753. 
 80. Crowder, supra note 64, at 933. 
 81. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (2000). The same principle was 
applied for granting mineral leases by co-owners of servitudes, id. § 31:166, and 
land, id. § 31:175. 
 82. Act No. 647, 1988 La. Acts 1686. 
 83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (2000). 
 84. See Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 23. 
 85. Id. at 28.  
 86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(B) (2000) (stating that the drilling unit is 
“the maximum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one 
well”). 
 87. See id. § 31:213(6). 
 88. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 25–26. 
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Alternatively, a simple contract may form a conventional unit 
without government mandate.89 Declared units and voluntary units 
are the two types of conventional units.90 A declared unit is derived 
from a mineral lease and is “declared unilaterally by the lessee 
under the terms of a pooling clause contained in an oil and gas 
lease that does not require the further consent of the lessor to the 
creation of [the] unit.”91 Without prior authorization from a 
landowner to his or her lessee to pool the granted mineral interest 
with other interests, the lessee seeking a conventional unit must 
turn to the voluntary unit.92 The voluntary unit is “created by the 
bilateral execution of a unit agreement by all parties in interest, 
including the landowner-lessor.”93 Voluntary unit agreements 
(VUAs) create units through contract that give only the 
contractually bound parties the right to participate in production 
and are only effective against those persons who are parties to the 
contract.94  
As compulsory units are formed by the Commissioner and 
declared units are formed through existing lease clauses, the 
voluntary unit is the only type of unitization that will lead to the 
scenario that this Comment addresseswhere consent to pool 
interests has not previously been acquired.95 An operator seeking 
to drill in an area may choose to seek a voluntary unit rather than a 
compulsory unit in order to avoid excessive costs associated with 
forming a compulsory unit through the Commissioner of 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. at 24. 
 90. Id. 
 91. McCollam, supra note 15, at 773 n.296. A declared unit may only be 
created where each joining lessee can create a valid unit through authorization in 
their lease. See id. at 776; see also Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50, 54 
(La. 1956). 
 92. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
 93. McCollam, supra note 15, at 773 n.297. All VUAs, as contractually 
derived regimes, are not effective against the interests of non-consenting 
burdened landowners, as the mineral right holder cannot unilaterally decrease 
the “use” burden required by the Mineral Code. See id. at 775. 
 94. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 43. See discussion 
infra Part I.E. 
 95. Compulsory unitizations are effective upon all interests that are found 
within the defined unit area as a function of the state’s police power. McCollam, 
supra note 15, at 775. Declared units are created with the consent of the grantor-
landowner through a defined power explicitly conferred in the mineral lease. Id. 
at 773 n.296. A declared unit may only be created where each joining lessee can 
create a valid unit through authorization in their lease. See id. at 775; see also 
Touchet, 86 So. 2d at 50. 
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Conservation.96 Or, because the application process for a 
compulsory unit can be time consuming, an operator may seek a 
voluntary unit to quickly unitize mineral interests to avoid 
prescription accruing against them.97 The creation of voluntary 
units raises the question of whether such a contractual arrangement 
can affect the interests of an apparent third party.98 A non-
consenting surface co-owner, like our hypothetical Kate, is such a 
third party to the contract who would be “affected” by the contract 
if the voluntary unit interrupted prescription running against a 
servitude burdening the co-owned land, like Bob’s servitude. 
E. The Necessity of a Surface Owner’s Consent for Voluntary 
Units 
The Louisiana Mineral Code does not speak to the process of 
voluntary unit formation. Comments to the Mineral Code state that 
conventional units, declared and voluntary units, are formed 
through the consent of those parties affected.99 It does not 
determine who is an affected party. The Mineral Code fails to 
address whether surface owner consent to the unit is necessary for 
a voluntary unit to affect the interests of that surface owner. The 
effects relative to an individual mineral right, including a mineral 
servitude, that result from a voluntary unitization depend upon two 
primary concerns: the location of the unit well and the extent to 
which the tract burdened by the mineral right is included within the 
unit area.100 The interruption of prescription that can result from 
the drilling of a well on a voluntary unit occurs for those mineral 
rights whose owners have consented to the VUA.101 Any 
interruption that results from drilling through a voluntary unit also 
affects landowners whose tracts are burdened by those mineral 
rights, as it ensures the mineral rights of those landowners do not 
revert back to them for at least a new ten-year period.102  
The comments to article 213 of the Mineral Code state that 
conventional units are formed “by a contract executed by all 
                                                                                                             
 96. The costs which may add up to burdensome levels are found in the 
geological and title research, application fees, profession fees, and more that are 
not as significant or not necessary in order to form a conventional unit. See 
Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 24–26, 42. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 42–43. 
 99. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000). 
 100. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 101. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 102. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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parties affected, or otherwise.”103 Landowners burdened by a 
mineral servitude can certainly be considered “parties affected” by 
the VUA, as off-tract production would interrupt the running of 
prescription for any portion of their land encompassed within the 
unit.104 Thus, the comments to the article may suggest that 
landowner consent is necessary.105 However, comments are not 
law.106 If the comments are read to make landowner consent 
necessary, it is an ill-defined statement when read in isolation, as 
the comments fail to define what an “affect” is that would 
necessitate the involvement of the “affected” party in the formation 
of the unit. Thankfully, general contract law principles, pre-
Mineral Code jurisprudence, and scholarly research support the 
view that voluntary unitizations require surface owner consent in 
order to affect those parties. 
Principles of Louisiana contract law show that if the 
landowners do not consent to the VUA, then they should not be 
bound by the contract. A VUA is only formed through contractual 
agreement between various “affected parties.”107 These contracts 
are agreements between two or more parties through which 
obligations are created.108 Contracts serve as law for the parties109 
but only produce effects for third parties when provided by law.110 
There is no law that enables voluntary units to burden the 
ownership interests of third parties. Therefore, voluntary units 
must not affect non-signatories to the VUA. 
In Eads Operating Co. v. Thompson, the Louisiana First Circuit 
Court of Appeals discussed conventional unitization, reciting that 
“[i]t was a necessary prerequisite . . . to the creation of such a unit 
that all interested landowners and leaseowners join in the unit 
agreement”111 and that creation of “such a unit . . . required 
                                                                                                             
 103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000). 
 104. See Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 129. 
 105. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000). 
 106. See, e.g., Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307, 312 (La. 
2012) (“While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may be 
helpful in determining legislative intent.”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2012). 
 109. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2012).  
 110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985 (2012). 
 111. Eads Operating Co. v. Thompson, 646 So. 2d 948, 953 (La. Ct. App. 
1994) (quoting Thomas M. Winfiele, New Legislation Relating to the 
Conservation Department, 8 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 9, 10 (1961)). 
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voluntary agreement by all interested parties.”112 To paraphrase, 
the court declared that “interested parties,” like surface owners, are 
unaffected by a voluntary unit unless they consent to be bound by 
the contract.113 Pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence sheds light on 
which parties are “interested” with respect to a VUA.114 
In Alexander v. Holt, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a mineral servitude holder was without the right 
to affect the prescription running against his servitude by entering 
into a VUA without also obtaining the consent of the landowner.115 
The court indicated that, otherwise, the VUA would serve as a 
mechanism for interruption outside those given to the mineral 
servitude owner by contract or law.116 Servitude owners “are 
powerless to extend their mineral rights without the consent of the 
landowners who, under the law, must clearly and definitely state or 
act in such a way so as to show that it was their intention to 
interrupt the running of prescription and start it anew.”117 This case 
makes clear that, without further consent from the landowner, the 
mineral servitude holder cannot extend his or her own rights 
beyond those given to the holder by the servitude and by law.118  
The Mineral Code dictates that the interruption of prescription 
running against a mineral servitude is accomplished through good 
faith drilling,119 production,120 acknowledgment,121 or, in limited 
circumstances, adoption of another party’s drilling operations on 
the servitude-burdened tract in question.122 Therefore, the right to 
unilaterally interrupt prescription running against a mineral 
servitude by means other than drilling on the burdened tract is not 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. at 954 (emphasis added) (quoting W. J. McAnelly, Jr., A Review of 
Poolwide Unitization Under Act 441 of 1960, 15 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 3, 6 
(1969)). 
 113. Id. at 953–54. 
 114. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1959). 
 115. Id. at 537 (“We therefore conclude that Holt’s voluntary action in 
signing the unitization agreement, even with the subsequent approval of the 
commissioner, was no more than a voluntary act upon his part and that he was, 
therefore, powerless to extend his mineral servitude by such voluntary act.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 536 (“If the order . . . is not binding on those who did not sign the 
conventional agreement, it is even the less binding upon nonsigning landowners 
or those having reversionary interests in minerals. Attempts on the part of 
mineral owners to perpetuate or to extend the lives of their mineral interests 
have frequently been held ineffective.”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:29 (2000). 
 120. Id. § 31:36. 
 121. Id. § 31:54. 
 122. Id. §§ 31:44–52. 
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vested in the servitude owner by law. As Alexander holds, the 
servitude owner is not also vested with the right to enter into a 
VUA and thereby interrupt prescription by good faith drilling or 
production from an off-tract well without the granting of such 
power expressly by the landowner.123 Although Alexander predates 
the adoption of the Mineral Code, its reasoning is supported by 
commentators.124 
As one commentator stated, servitude owners “cannot unilaterally 
decrease the use burden imposed by law as a prerequisite to the 
maintenance of such interests.”125 Additionally, Professor Patrick 
Ottinger made a worthy point when he inquired into the 
consequences of holding that a servitude owner could unilaterally 
interrupt prescription by entering into a VUA without landowner 
consent: if all of the persons having an interest in production from a 
unit well fail to agree to the unitization and this is held to be a valid 
conventional unitization, how many interested parties must consent 
to form a valid unit?126 In other words, if the universal consent 
among affected parties is not required to affect third parties to the 
VUA, then what amount of consent is too little?  
Given the weight of statutory, jurisprudential, and scholarly 
evidence to the point that a surface owner’s consent is necessary to 
form a voluntary unit that affects his interests, the conclusion that 
such consent is necessary must follow. Any other conclusion 
would lead to unforeseen and unpredictable consequences. 
Although this Comment supports clarification through codification 
of the rule that surface owner consent is necessary for a voluntary 
unit’s off-tract drilling to affect the surface owner’s tract, the 
weight of authority on the subject and the lack of countervailing 
evidence leads to the inescapable resolution that surface owner 
consent to a voluntary unitization is necessary for the voluntary 
unit to affect the surface owner’s tract. 
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
The surface tract that Kate co-owns may be a part of a 
voluntary unit created by Black Gold with her fellow surface co-
owner, Mike, and the mineral servitude owner, Bob, but Kate 
claims that her consent was necessary to include the tract within 
                                                                                                             
 123. Alexander, 116 So. 2d at 536. 
 124. See McCollam, supra note 15, at 775; Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, 
supra note 30, at 129. 
 125. McCollam, supra note 15, at 776. 
 126. Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 129. 
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the unit.127 Louisiana jurisprudence and legal scholarship strongly 
indicate that all “affected parties” must consent to a voluntary unit 
in order for their interests to be affected by the VUA.128 
Additionally, a general co-ownership principle in Louisiana is that 
a co-owner cannot encumber the interests of the co-owned thing 
without consent from all of the co-owners.129 In other words, Mike 
cannot put a contractually burdensome obligation on the entirety of 
the co-owned thing without the consent of Kate because to do so 
would certainly affect her ownership interest in “each molecule” of 
the co-owned tract.130 Accordingly, the voluntary unit must not be 
read to affect Kate’s rights as a co-owner of the burdened tract 
because she did not consent to the unitization. 
Difficulty arises, though, in finding a remedy for Kate once the 
voluntary unit has been created, Bob and Mike have consented to 
the VUA, and good faith drilling or production has occurred. As 
Louisiana law currently stands, three remedial options are evident. 
First, a court may adopt an all-or-nothing approach such that Mike 
and Bob’s VUA fails to interrupt prescription accruing against 
Bob’s servitude as to the entire tract because Kate’s consent was 
not obtained. Second, a court may synthesize mineral co-
ownership law and unitization theory to allow Mike’s majority 
ownership to unilaterally burden both his and Kate’s interests in 
the surface tract through the VUA. Third, a court may decide to 
interrupt prescription of a portion of the servitude proportionally to 
the ownership interests of Kate and Mike.  
A. The “All-or-Nothing” Approach 
The Mineral Code does not empower a servitude owner to 
unilaterally contract for off-tract, good faith drilling or production 
to interrupt prescription accruing against the servitude by means of 
his or her unilateral consent to a VUA.131 Servitude prescription is 
only interrupted by off-tract drilling in two situations: when the 
servitude (in part or in whole) is included in a compulsory unit by 
                                                                                                             
 127. See supra Introduction. 
 128. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 129. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 130. See Denègre, supra note 65, at 611. 
 131. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000) (declaring that rules of 
interruption may only be made less burdensome expressly and in writing by 
agreement between the parties and only by allowing unit operations to interrupt 
for the whole servitude regardless of whether the whole servitude lies within the 
unit area or the location of the unit well); Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra 
note 30, at 128–30; see also discussion supra Part I.E. 
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dictate of the Commissioner of Conservation, or through inclusion 
of the servitude (in part or in whole) in a declared unit through the 
combination of pooling rights granted with a servitude or lease by 
the landowner.132 Therefore, the voluntary unit must not be 
interpreted to affect surface owners who neither consented to the 
VUA nor granted to a burdening mineral servitude the ability to 
unitize the mineral interest.133 
The co-owner of a surface tract cannot bind fellow co-owners to 
an encumbrance on their co-owned surface rights without universal 
approval, except in limited circumstances.134 A co-owner may enter 
into a valid contract, such as a mineral lease, with a third party with 
regard to his share of a co-owned thing as the object, but such a 
contract is ineffectual towards the interests of his fellow co-owners 
in the co-owned thing until their consent is also obtained.135 
Logically, the same rationale could apply to a VUA entered into by 
a co-owner. When faced with facts similar to those presented in 
Kate’s hypothetical situation, a court may conclude that a surface 
co-owner can individually enter into a VUA but that off-tract 
operations through the voluntary unit cannot interrupt prescription 
accruing against a servitude until all surface co-owners consent to 
the VUA.  
                                                                                                             
 132. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000); Ottinger, Conventional 
Unitization, supra note 9, at 27–41. Adoption of the operations of another to 
interrupt prescription of the mineral right is not available in cases of off-tract 
drilling as the servitude owner may “adopt” another’s good faith drilling or 
production to interrupt prescription only when the drilling operations are on the 
tract burdened by the servitude, unless the landowner provided otherwise when 
creating the servitude. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:44 (2000) (“A mineral 
servitude owner may adopt operations or production by a person other than 
those designated by Article 42 if his servitude includes the right to conduct 
operations of the kind involved.”). 
 133. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 134. Those circumstances exist when landowners with 80% of the ownership 
interest in a tract grant a lease or a mineral servitude. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
31:164, 166. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31:175 (2000) (stating co-owners of a mineral servitude may operate on the land 
as long as 80% of the co-owners consent to the operation). 
 135. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012) (“A co-owner may freely lease, alienate, 
or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision. The consent of all the co-
owners is required for the lease, alienation, or encumbrance of the entire thing 
held in indivision.”). Unless the grantor of a mineral right has 80% co-
ownership interest in the land or servitude tract, the servitude or lease granted 
will not allow the grantee to drill on the tract until the co-owner(s) of at least 
80% of the co-ownership interest consent(s). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 
166, 175 (2000). 
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This “all-or-nothing” approach protects Kate’s interests. Mike, 
her fellow co-owner, could not encumber Kate’s interests without 
her consent to the VUA, and Bob could not unilaterally decrease 
the burden imposed on him by law and by the terms of his 
servitude. Accordingly, Bob’s consent to the VUA would not 
interrupt prescription accruing against his servitude without the 
concurrence of all parties who would be “affected” by the 
unitization, here both Mike and Kate. Prescription would continue 
to accrue against Bob’s mineral servitude until an interruptive 
event occurs or a suspensive condition is fulfilled.136 
B. The Hybrid Solution 
In the interest of preventing a potentially inequitable resolution 
that deprives a majority surface co-owner, like Mike, from using 
the land as he pleases, a Louisiana court may look to the Mineral 
Code for an egalitarian solution. By using a hybrid approach, a 
court could conclude that, if the ownership interest of the 
consenting surface co-owners to a VUA is at least 80%, 
prescription running against the servitude should be interrupted.137 
Under the Mineral Code, a co-owner, or group of co-owners, 
whose ownership interest is equal to or greater than 80% of the 
total interests in co-owned land, may grant the right to drill on the 
land through a lease or servitude without procuring the consent of 
the remaining co-owners.138 To burden the interests of the non-
consenting co-owner(s), the operator must make “every effort to 
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, [offer] to contract with 
them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted with 
another co-owner.”139 Additionally, the co-owner of the land who 
does not consent is not liable for any costs of the drilling 
operations except out of his share of production.140 The same rule 
applies to co-owners of land who grant a mineral lease.141 
A court may find an analogous argument to the Mineral Code’s 
80% co-owner consent exceptions persuasive such that the ability 
of co-owners to enter into voluntary units for the exploration and 
                                                                                                             
 136. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 137. The conclusion is analogous to the Mineral Code articles that allow for 
mineral leases and servitudes to be created with the consent of co-owners of the 
land whose ownership interest in the land is 80% or more. See discussion supra 
Part I.C. 
 138. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 (2000). 
 139. Id. § 31:164 (alteration in original). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. § 31:166. 
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production of oil and gas would not be curtailed by a resistant or 
missing minority interest owner. This solution may enable 
minority co-owners to voice their opinions and convince other co-
owners to resist the unitization. But, in a situation like Kate’s, her 
resistance would not be successful since there is only one other co-
owner who owns over 80%. Such efforts could only prevent 
voluntary unitization of the co-owned tract if the resistant co-
owners own, in the aggregate, more than 20% of the co-owned 
thing. This feature preserves, to some degree, the civilian concept 
of ownership in indivision by maintaining some autonomy between 
co-owners.142 However, this solution would also prevent a small 
minority of co-owners from imposing their will on the majority. 
This is an approach that would preserve the civilian emphasis on 
co-owner sovereignty, but simultaneously employ a democratic, 
majoritarian element that encourages the use of voluntary units to 
efficiently develop oil and gas in complex ownership environments. 
C. The Proportional Interruption Method 
In the first two approaches, either Kate’s refusal to consent will 
cause the failure of the unit to encompass any part of the servitude 
tract or Mike’s consent to Black Gold’s unitization will result in 
the complete inclusion of Bob’s servitude in the unit. However, 
another solution offers an intermediate approach to these two 
extreme results. The Mineral Code provides that valid compulsory 
or conventional units with good faith drilling or production that 
encompass some, but not all, of a tract burdened by a servitude will 
cause interruption of prescription only for the portion of the 
servitude within the unit.143 As a consequence, a court may view 
operations conducted under a voluntary unit that is not fully 
consented to as ineffectual against the interests of the non-
consenting co-owner, but a court may also find that the VUA 
remains valid as to the consenting surface co-owner’s interests. 
Such a finding could interrupt the running of prescription against 
the servitude proportional to the consenting surface co-owners’ 
ownership interests. 
The surface owner (full or co-owner) has incentives to enter 
into the VUA with the servitude owner. The consent will likely be 
                                                                                                             
 142. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 143. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33, 37 (2000). The default rule regarding 
the extent of interruption from an off-tract unit well may be modified by 
contract, but must be agreed to expressly and in writing. See Ottinger, The 
Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 126–28. 
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given as a response to some consideration and, by allowing the 
servitude owner to unitize his servitude, will diminish the 
likelihood that the mineral servitude owner will drill on the surface 
property.144 It will be up to the individual landowner or co-owner 
to determine if those interests outweigh the potential reversion of 
the mineral rights back to the surface property if the servitude 
owner fails to drill on the property or a compulsory unit covering 
the tract in question is not formed and drilled upon.145 The mineral 
servitude owner has the incentive to enter into the VUA to extend 
the life of at least a portion of the mineral servitude and share the 
costs of drilling and production, avoiding the totality of the 
enormous expense and risk involved with drilling personally.146 
Without the consent of the surface owner, the servitude owner 
cannot use a voluntary unit to interrupt prescription accruing 
against his right and will be reluctant to enter into a voluntary unit 
that prevents him from also drilling on his servitude.147 
Accordingly, the operator has the incentive to pursue the surface 
owner’s consent because, without that consent, a servitude owner 
may not enter into the VUA. Under the proportional approach, all 
parties would have incentives to use voluntary unitization to 
quickly pool mineral rights and economically explore. 
This solution would preserve the rights of a non-consenting co-
owner against a servitude owner trying to interrupt the running of 
prescription against its servitude. It also prevents non-consenting 
co-owners from inhibiting those co-owners who wish to enter into 
the VUA and allows the mineral servitude holder to exploit its 
mineral rights. Under this solution, any payments made in 
consideration of signing the VUA and any production payments 
from the unit operator to the consenting parties would not be 
                                                                                                             
 144. For a discussion of motivations for signing a unitization agreement, see 
supra Introduction. 
 145. Drilling from compulsory units has the effect of interrupting 
prescription running against those mineral interests that are encompassed within 
the unit but outside the drilling tract. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33, 37 
(2000). 
 146. Non-unit wells will only affect those interests associated with the tract 
that the well is drilled upon. For a discussion of incentives and considerations of 
unitizations, see Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 24–26. 
 147. The effects upon a surface owner of a voluntary unit are limited to the 
interruption of prescription accruing against burdening mineral rights and are the 
rationale for requiring their consent before allowing these units to affect the 
surface owner. See discussion supra Part I.E. There would not appear to be a 
prohibition against a servitude owner entering into a unitization agreement in 
which he participates in costs and shares in revenue but does not interrupt 
prescription running against his mineral interest. Id. 
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wasted. This remedy would respect all players and preserves the 
ease and simplicity with which voluntary units should be formed. 
D. Holes in the Three Solutions 
A court faced with the difficulties posed by a minority surface 
owner’s non-consent to a voluntary unit seems to be left to choose 
between one of three solutions. One solution would find that the 
voluntary unit had no effect upon the co-owned tract, another 
would dictate total interruptive effect against prescription running 
against the burdening servitude, and the last would divide the 
servitude into prescribed and interrupted sections. However, each 
solution faces challenges to its viability either because of its 
inconsistency with existing law or due to the ancillary effects of its 
application. 
1. Problems with the “All-or-Nothing” Approach 
The “all-or-nothing” approach, while preserving the civilian 
rule that one co-owner cannot unilaterally burden a fellow co-
owner’s interest, would nullify the effects of the contractual 
arrangement made between the consenting surface co-owner(s) and 
servitude owner(s) to create the voluntary unit against any part of 
the tract, payments made by the mineral lessee in exchange for 
consent, revenue sharing between those believed to be in the 
voluntary unit,148 and the distributions of drilling costs between the 
consenting parties.149 Allowing the servitude to not be interrupted 
by such an arrangement would curtail the ability of the servitude 
owner to exploit its mineral rights because giving any surface co-
owner the power to impede unitization introduces a formidable 
obstacle to entering into a VUA. This approach would also allow 
any co-owner to infringe fellow surface co-owners’ freedom of 
choice to engage in potentially lucrative oil and gas exploration.150 
                                                                                                             
 148. It is worth noting that if a non-consenting landowner or mineral right 
owner knowingly accepts payments made in accordance with an agreement, the 
accepting party may be held to have ratified that agreement. See La. Canal Co. 
v. Heyd, 181 So. 439 (La. 1938) (holding a non-signatory party’s acceptance of 
payments under the terms of a mineral lease served to bind the accepting party 
to that lease). 
 149. Cost sharing, equitable production allocation, and the ease of voluntary 
unit formation are the primary reasons that a lessee would seek to form a 
voluntary unit. See supra Introduction. 
 150. The 80% rule was adopted by the Legislature in order to avoid this 
result in other mineral law contexts. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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Additionally, this remedy may give operators less security in their 
exploration activities involving co-owned lands, as any failure of 
universal co-owner consent in the past may make significant 
investment obsolete.151 
Enabling non-consenting surface co-owners to prevent the co-
owned tract from entering a voluntary unitization gives the co-
owner who withholds consent an inordinate amount of leverage with 
an oil and gas company. This is the very problem that the 
Legislature sought to prevent when it amended the Mineral Code in 
1986 and 1988 to allow for a significant majority of co-owners to 
“out-vote” the non-consenting co-owners when authorizing 
exploration activity on their own tract.152 Without such an exception 
to the general rule of requiring full consent, co-owners may be 
incentivized to withhold consent in order to procure the most 
advantageous deal from the operators by being the last co-owner to 
agree to the VUA. Allowing minority co-owners like Kate to 
unilaterally inhibit a voluntary unit from affecting their tracts may 
make the otherwise efficient method of pooling mineral interests by 
VUA too cumbersome for widespread use by operators in 
Louisiana. 
2. Problems with the Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid solution, analogizing to the 80% rule, gives rise to 
two principal problems. First, non-consenting minority co-owners 
would have their property rights taken without compensation. 
Under the Mineral Code articles allowing for the 80% consent 
exceptions, the non-consenting co-owners are entitled to revenue 
generated by drilling through the agreement to which they did not 
consent but by which they are affected as a result of the 80% 
rule.153 Therefore, the non-consenting co-owners are not totally 
without recovery for the encumbrance of their ownership interests 
in the co-owned thing.154 However, if the 80% rule is applied to the 
situation where a surface co-owner does not consent to a VUA, 
there is no recovery for the non-consenting surface co-owner 
whose ownership interest is not more than 20%. The surface co-
                                                                                                             
 151. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956) 
(invalidating a declared unit when it attempted to include the interests of a 
landowner who did not originally consent to the declared unit and, as a result, 
there were no interruptive effects as to the prescription accruing against a 
mineral interest burdening a non-drillsite tract allegedly in the unit area). 
 152. See discussion supra Part I.C; Crowder, supra note 64, at 944. 
 153. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 166 (2000). 
 154. Crowder, supra note 64, at 945. 
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owner does not hold the mineral rights when there exists a 
servitude on the tract and is consequently excluded from revenue 
from production. All consideration obtained by the consenting 
surface co-owner functions like a bonus for signing the VUA. As 
non-signatories, non-consenting surface co-owners are not entitled 
to a payment made in compensation for cooperation as they are not 
in privity to the private contract. This analogous solution would 
deprive a non-consenting surface co-owner of property rights 
without recovery.155  
Second, this twist on existing exceptions is inconsistent with 
civilian principles of interpretation. Civilian statutory interpretation 
demands that when there is an exception to a general principle, the 
exception should be read to apply strictly to the individual 
circumstances it involves.156 The general rule from the Civil Code is 
that co-owners must unanimously consent to an encumbrance on 
their co-owned thing.157 To construct an analogical solution from 
exceptions to that general rule would be inconsistent with civilian 
methodology. 
3. Problems with the Proportional Interruption Approach 
Like the other two solutions, the proportional remedy has two 
potential complications. First, when the prescription of nonuse 
running against a servitude fully accrues, the proportional solution 
leaves unanswered the question of how to divide the servitude 
between prescribed and interrupted portions of the servitude. 
Second, division of the servitude seems to run against the Mineral 
Code’s clear statement that mineral servitudes are indivisible.158 
In the case of a declared or compulsory unit encompassing a 
part of the mineral servitude area but not the whole, the application 
of the “partial interruption” rule is relatively simple.159 The unit 
areas are clearly defined through either the lease giving the pooling 
rights or the order of the Commissioner, but the clarity disappears 
in the case of voluntary units—units left undefined in either the 
                                                                                                             
 155. The non-consenting surface co-owner may have a case for unjust 
enrichment (enrichment without cause). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (2012). An 
analysis of this potential remedy for the non-consenting co-owner is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. However, an adoption of this 80% solution may lead to 
further litigation between the parties. 
 156. See State ex rel. Murtagh v. Dep’t of City Civil Serv., 42 So. 2d 65, 73–
74 (La. 1949). 
 157. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 158. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 (2000). 
 159. Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 127–28. 
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Mineral Code or post-Mineral Code jurisprudence.160 In the case of 
voluntary units created without the full consent of burdened 
surface co-owners, the coverage of the voluntary unit is less clear 
due to the partial nature of the consent given to include the co-
owned land within the voluntary unit. In theory, whatever 
ownership interest the co-owner had in the land is upon every 
molecule of substance of the land.161 If the proportional 
interruption remedy were used in the case of Kate and Mike’s 
hypothetical tract, the time accruing against the servitude 
burdening each molecule of the co-owned tract would be 
interrupted for nine-tenths of each molecule (i.e., the proportional 
share of Mike’s ownership) but would continue accruing for one-
tenth of every molecule (i.e., the proportional share of Kate’s 
ownership).  
In the event that a court holds that the entrance of a servitude 
and partial surface interest into a voluntary unit would place that 
tract partially within the unit area, the question of application 
necessarily arises. Upon the conclusion of the ten-year prescriptive 
period running against a portion of the servitude, the court must 
then decide whether to divide the servitude geographically or to 
simply interrupt prescription on the servitude proportionally to the 
ownership interests of the consenting and non-consenting surface 
co-owners. A court would likely choose the latter option. A 
geographic division would create questions of how the division 
would take place upon land and potentially cause more uncertainty, 
litigation, and expense for the parties seeking resolution. The 
division by area would potentially increase the burden on the 
servitude owner by forcing the servitude owner to drill wells on 
that newly divided portion of land in order to preserve his mineral 
right by interrupting prescription.162 
When the servitude partially prescribes, the court may avoid 
these aforementioned difficulties by instead distributing to the non-
consenting surface co-owner a portion of the mineral interests 
previously held by the servitude owner without geographic 
division.163 The mineral interests of the mineral servitude owner 
would simply be preserved in proportion to the consent obtained 
                                                                                                             
 160. Id. 
 161. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 162. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:179 (2000). 
 163. Upon the occurrence of this solution, however, the servitude holder may 
be placed in a situation requiring it to gain the approval of at least 80% of the 
co-owners of the surface in order to drill on the tract, whereby placing the 
servitude owner in a diminished situation that was not contracted for upon the 
creation of the servitude. 
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from the surface co-owners. The surface co-owner would hold a 
percentage of a tract’s mineral rights proportional to the co-
owner’s ownership interest and would be free to lease the rights, 
apply to unitize them, or seek a partition of the property into 
geographically separate areas. Therefore, the remedy to the issue 
on the mechanics of dividing the servitude partially prescribed by a 
voluntary unit presents itself through a non-geographic solution. 
However, a legal implication of the division of a mineral servitude 
also presents a problem for the proportional approach. 
The proportional solution appears to divide Bob’s servitude 
when mineral servitudes, like predial servitudes,164 are indivisible.165 
Mineral servitude indivisibility means, for instance, that in a case 
where co-owned land is partitioned, a separately owned mineral 
servitude that burdens the land of the co-owners is not divided 
between the partitioned tracts.166 This general rule protects the 
interests of third-party servitude owners so that preserving their 
mineral rights does not become more onerous and complicated.167 
A complication of dividing a mineral servitude may be that the 
owner of what was formerly one servitude would be required to 
drill multiple wells to prevent prescription of non-use accruing on 
what is now several servitudes instead of just one.  
                                                                                                             
 164. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 652 (2012). 
 165. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 (2000). The mandate of servitude 
indivisibility is essentially excepted in several situations. Pre-Mineral Code 
jurisprudence suggested that when an existing servitude is granted in part to 
another by geographic area, the servitude is not divided but the “advantages” of 
the servitude could be divided. See McDougal, supra note 32, at 1119. This 
means that the prescription accruing against one geographically subdivided 
portion of the mineral servitude would not be interrupted through use of the 
other subdivided portion. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:69 cmt. (2000); Ohio 
Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 34 So. 2d 746 (La. 1947). Pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence 
also suggested that when a servitude owner grants a portion of the servitude to 
the owner of the surface and thereby make the remaining servitude non-
contiguous, the servitude portions are divided by the resultant non-contiguous 
tract. See Arent v. Hunter, 133 So. 157 (La. 1931); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:69 
cmt. (2000). 
 166. Martin, supra note 36, at 443 (“Although the Louisiana mineral 
servitude doctrine precludes the creation of a ‘mineral estate’ independent of full 
title to the land, land subject to a mineral servitude may not be partitioned by 
licitation with respect to the servitude because the landowners do not hold a 
common element of ownership with the servitude owner.”). See Steele v. 
Denning, 445 So. 2d 94 (La. Ct. App.), aff’d, 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984). 
 167. The rule regarding the indivisibility of the mineral servitude flows from 
the indivisibility of predial servitudes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 cmt. 
(2000). The indivisibility of predial servitude is made out of concern for adverse 
effects upon the dominant estate. LA. CIV. CODE art. 652 cmt. c (2012). 
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The Mineral Code states that servitudes may be partially 
prescribed by area when included in a conventional or compulsory 
unit.168 The division of mineral servitudes seems to occur in cases 
of partial unitization of a mineral servitude. When prescription is 
interrupted for a portion of a mineral servitude inside a unit by 
production from an off-tract producing unit well, the prescription 
for the portion of the servitude outside the unit continues to 
accrue.169 For practical purposes, the servitude would seem to be 
divided upon the arrival of the full ten-year prescriptive period.170 
One portion of the servitude would remain existent, but the mineral 
rights previously held by the mineral servitude portion outside the 
unit area would revert back to the landowner.171 Though the 
“division” terminology is not used in the partial unitization 
context, the rule against mineral servitude divisibility seems to be 
functionally circumvented. 
Since servitudes may be partially prescribed by area when 
included in a conventional unit,172 this rule should apply with equal 
force to voluntary units—a subset of conventional unitizations.173 
Servitudes only partially included in voluntary units through a 
failure of surface co-owner consent to the voluntary unit should 
partially prescribe. The effects of partial unitization and partial 
prescription through a voluntary unit are not distinguished from 
partial unitization and partial prescription through a declared or 
compulsory unitization.174 The exception to the prohibition against 
mineral servitude indivisibility available for partial unitization 
through conventional or compulsory units is not withheld from 
situations involving voluntary units and should therefore apply in 
these circumstances. 
                                                                                                             
 168. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). Mineral Code articles 34, 35, 
and 37 state the same rule that partial inclusion of a mineral servitude in a unit 
will cause prescription to be interrupted for only that portion of the mineral 
servitude included in the unit. See id. §§ 31:34–35, 37. 
 169. Id. § 31:33. 
 170. See McDougal, supra note 32, at 1144. (“Article 33, which reflects pre-
Code jurisprudence, provides that a good faith drilling of a well to the unitized 
sand or sands on unit land not subject to the mineral servitude that turns out to 
be a dry hole interrupts prescription of nonuse only for the portion of the lands 
subject to the servitude included in the unit, not the entire servitude. Article 34 
provides for the same division if the well is shut-in, and article 37, which 
reflects prior jurisprudence, provides for the same result when the well comes in 
as a producer.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 171. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 172. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000); id. §§ 31:34–35, 37. 
 173. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 174. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:34–35, 37 (2000). 
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III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: DEFINE VOLUNTARY UNITS AND 
AFFIRM CO-OWNER SOVEREIGNTY 
Co-ownership principles establish that a co-owner cannot 
encumber a co-owned thing without the full consent of all co-
owners.175 A thorough reading of the jurisprudence surrounding 
voluntary unitization leads to the conclusion that surface owner 
consent to a voluntary unit is necessary for the unit to affect his or 
her interests.176 These two findings may cause a court to adopt any 
of the three approaches available under current law. However, the 
“all-or-nothing” approach, holding that one co-owner may prevent 
a voluntary unit from affecting the co-owned thing, produces a 
harsh result for operators and mineral rights holders.177 This 
approach would result in prescription continuing to accrue against 
Bob’s servitude despite the drilling on the voluntary unit, 
protecting non-consenting surface co-owner Kate’s interests. But it 
would disregard the VUA between Mike, Bob, and the unit 
operator, render pointless any compensation made to Mike and 
Bob for entering the VUA, and force Bob to move away from the 
quick and less expensive voluntary unit to more expensive options 
to preserve his mineral rights (e.g., have a well drilled on his 
servitude or seek a compulsory unit). 
Alternatively, the hybrid solution would enable a significant 
majority of the co-owners to overrule a small minority in order to 
encourage the economical and unwasteful exploration of minerals 
in the unit area. A court’s application of the hybrid solution would 
result in non-consenting co-owners, like Kate, being left 
potentially without economic recovery from an encumbrance of the 
co-owned thing.178 This approach also interprets exceptions to the 
general rule of universal co-owner consent broadly when civilian 
methodology mandates they be read narrowly.179 Accordingly, a 
codification of this result is not an ideal solution.  
The proportional approach, on the other hand, is the most 
equitable solution available and would also encourage the use of 
VUAs as a means of economically exploring for oil and gas. This 
                                                                                                             
 175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012). See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 176. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 177. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 178. Although applying the 80% consent exception to voluntary unitizations 
and surface owners may result in non-consenting co-owners being offered 
substantially the same deal as the consenting co-owner, non-consent would 
deprive the non-consenting co-owner of property rights without compensation. 
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 166 (2000). 
 179. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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approach would allow surface co-owners to voluntarily consent to 
their interests being a part of a VUA and would thus extend the 
voluntary unit over the tract but only to the extent of the consenters’ 
interests.180 It would not affect the interests of non-consenting co-
owners who are not a party to the contract.181 However, it would not 
give those non-consenting surface co-owners a heavily advantaged 
bargaining position with an operator seeking to form a voluntary 
unit, as the operator would not need all of the surface co-owners’ 
consent to form a unit over the area. The problems of the 
proportional resolution can be avoided by division according to 
ownership interest and not through an arbitrarily determined 
geographic area,182 and by treatment of the servitude “division” as a 
permissible and necessary function of partial unitization.183 
The proportional approach should be adopted by the Louisiana 
courts and its Legislature because the solution preserves the 
ownership rights and interests of each party involved in the 
unitization: land co-owners, mineral right holders, and mineral 
lessees.184 The Mineral Code should clarify the way voluntary units 
are formed, define their effects, and adopt the proportional solution 
for when courts are confronted with a scenario similar to Mike and 
Kate’s in order to avoid inequitable results amongst the various 
parties and to promote the use of the voluntary unit as a relatively 
speedy and inexpensive method to unitize mineral interests. 
A. Voluntary Unitization and the Mineral Code 
The Legislature should act to define the voluntary unit—
without clarity, the use of VUAs in Louisiana remains in a state of 
uncertainty, an unattractive situation to would-be mineral lessees, 
mineral right holders, and landowners. Additionally, the answer to 
the question of whether the voluntary unit affects non-consenting 
landowners may have significant effects upon the current 
ownership of mineral rights across the state. Any voluntary unit 
formed without the consent of every surface owner in its defined 
area may have the mineral ownership which the operator believed 
to have existed turned on its head simply because one or more 
surface owners did not consent to the VUA.185 Mineral rights (e.g., 
                                                                                                             
 180. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 181. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 182. See discussion supra Part II.D.3. 
 183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). See id. §§ 31:34–35, 37. 
 184. See discussion supra Parts II.C., II.D.3. 
 185. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
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mineral servitudes) may prescribe because drilling activity from 
the unit failed to interrupt prescription running against them since 
the surface owners previously burdened by the mineral servitude 
did not consent to any form of conventional unitization. At the 
same time, surface owners must be included in the voluntary unit 
formation process and must have that right codified; otherwise, the 
powers of the servitude owner to interrupt its own prescription may 
be greatly expanded beyond those expressly enumerated in the 
Mineral Code.186 
Accordingly, the Mineral Code should be amended to 
recognize this right. Language should be added to Mineral Code 
article 213(6)—the article, in current form, inadequately articulates 
the unitization process—to explicitly recognize this right of surface 
co-owners. The proposal below clarifies the law regarding 
voluntary unit formation: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, a voluntary unit is 
formed through an agreement between consenting parties 
and is ineffective against the interests of non-signatory 
parties, including landowners burdened by mineral rights, 
mineral right owners, and mineral lessees.187 
This alteration would not change the effects of any provision in 
the Mineral Code. However, it would serve to clarify that any 
interests not brought into the VUA by contract would be 
unaffected by the agreement, including the burdened surface 
owner’s interests in the reversion of a mineral servitude back to the 
landowner after the ten-year prescriptive period of nonuse fully 
accrues. The use of the modifier “non-signatory” clearly expresses 
the intention that the parties affected must be directly involved 
with the contractual creation of the unit. This addition would only 
                                                                                                             
 186. Id. 
 187. The full text of the proposed Mineral Code article 213(6) would thus 
read: 
(6)(a) “Unit” means an area of land, deposit, or deposits of minerals, 
stratum or strata, or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to which 
parties with interests therein are bound to share minerals produced on a 
specified basis and as to which those having the right to conduct 
drilling or mining operations therein are bound to share investment and 
operating costs on a specified basis. A unit may be formed by 
convention or by order of an agency of the state or federal government 
empowered to do so. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, a voluntary unit is formed 
through an agreement between consenting parties and is ineffective 
against the interests of non-signatory parties, including landowners 
burdened by mineral rights, mineral right owners, and mineral lessees. 
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alter the definition of conventional unitization as far as voluntary 
units are concerned and would leave unaffected the well-
established jurisprudential rules regarding the formation and effect 
of declared units.188 Because of the rule that on-tract drilling 
interrupts prescription accruing against a servitude, regardless of 
whether the servitude is fully encompassed by the unit,189 the 
statement “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” is necessary. This 
statement ensures that the proposed paragraph does not conflict 
with that rule regarding on-tract drilling. Consent of the landowner 
to form a voluntary unit is unnecessary when the drill site is on the 
surface tract, as the servitude owner had the legal capacity upon 
the creation of the servitude to drill on the tract and thus interrupt 
prescription running against the entire servitude.190 
For a non-consenting surface co-owner like Kate, this provision 
should make clear that her interests are protected against inclusion 
in the VUA without her express consent. However, the provision 
does not outline how her failure to consent would affect Bob’s 
servitude, the interests of her fellow co-owner, Mike, or the 
undertakings of Black Gold Drilling.  
B. The Rights of Surface Co-Owners 
Even with the voluntary unit defined by Mineral Code article 
213, a court may interpret the provision such that neither Mike nor 
Kate is affected by drilling upon the voluntary unit, even though 
Mike signed the VUA.191 Or, Mike’s consent may be read to be 
binding upon the tract through analogy to the 80% exception.192 
Thus, the Legislature should amend the Mineral Code to further 
clarify voluntary units’ effects on non-signatory surface co-owners. 
The adoption of the language below to Mineral Code article 37—
the article addressing the extent to which production from a unit 
well will affect tracts wholly and partially encompassed by the 
unit—would effectuate that result: 
A co-owner of land burdened by a mineral servitude may 
contract for his interest in the land to be included in a 
voluntary unit without the consent of the remaining co-
                                                                                                             
 188. See Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 27–42. For 
purposes of clarity, a definition of a declared unit in the Mineral Code should 
also be included, but such a proposal is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 189. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000). 
 190. See id. §§ 31:21–23. 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 192. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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owners. Such an act is ineffective as to the interests of non-
signatory co-owners. A voluntary unit is only effective to 
interrupt prescription accruing against a separate mineral 
right proportional to the interest(s) of the consenting 
landowner(s) burdened by that right.193 
This addition would preserve the traditional civilian rule of co-
owner sovereignty194 and allow a surface co-owner to gain 
compensation for entering into a VUA. At the same time, it would 
not affect the individual ownership interests of other co-owners in 
the co-owned thing. The codification of the proportional approach 
would not affect servitude owners’ rights to drill on burdened land, 
lease their mineral right for drilling, seek a compulsory unit, or 
enter into a conventional unit when their lease or servitude 
agreement allows for unitization of their mineral right. This 
solution only expands the servitude owner’s rights. 
Such a provision would provide the servitude owner an 
economical way to interrupt prescription on the mineral servitude, 
in proportion to consenting surface co-owner consent, by drilling 
through a voluntary unit’s off-tract well, a method that was not 
previously available to the servitude owner.195 The proposed 
change does so by giving the co-owners of the burdened land the 
ability to extend the encumbrance as to their own unique 
ownership interest in exchange for compensation. The extension 
                                                                                                             
 193. An appropriate location for this addition to the Mineral Code is in the 
articles providing for a servitude to be partially interrupted by area. As a 
provision that ultimately will allow for prescription to remain accruing for one 
portion of a servitude and be interrupted for another, it is logically consistent 
with articles in Chapter 4, Part 4, Subpart B, of the Mineral Code. The addition 
of a second paragraph to article 37 would provide a natural flow from the 
preceding five articles regarding unitized production partially interrupting a 
servitude. The full text of the proposed Mineral Code article 37 would read: 
(a) Production from a conventional or compulsory unit embracing all or 
part of the tract burdened by a mineral servitude interrupts prescription, 
but if the unit well is on land other than that burdened by the servitude, 
the interruption extends only to that portion of the servitude tract 
included in the unit. 
(b) A co-owner of land burdened by a mineral servitude may contract 
for his interest in the land to be included in a voluntary unit without the 
consent of the remaining co-owners. Such an act is ineffective as to the 
interests of non-signatory co-owners. A voluntary unit is only effective 
to interrupt prescription accruing against a separate mineral right 
proportional to the interest(s) of the consenting landowner(s) burdened 
by that right.  
 194. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 195. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
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then enables the mineral servitude owner to interrupt prescription 
accruing against his servitude by drilling a well through a 
voluntary unit, sharing costs and revenue between neighboring 
mineral interests. This addition simultaneously empowers the 
landowner and servitude owner in previously unavailable ways and 
makes voluntary unitization a more predictable and attractive 
option for oil and gas operators. 
Under this modification, Kate, the hypothetical non-consenting 
co-owner, has options in regards to using her newly acquired 
mineral rights when Bob’s servitude partially prescribes. She 
would be able to contract to be included in a voluntary unit, seek 
the formation of a compulsory unit that would include her tract, or 
seek a judicial partition of the co-owned land, as she is in full 
ownership of all the rights associated with her share of the land. A 
partition would enable the previously non-consenting co-owner, 
Kate, to apply for a permit to drill upon her now solely-owned 
partitioned tract. 
Adopting the proposed amendments to the Mineral Code, 
which would allow surface co-owners to individually enter into a 
VUA and servitude owners to have their servitude interrupted by 
partial co-owner consent, incentivizes the use of VUAs and 
removes uncertainty surrounding how the voluntary unit affects a 
non-consenting co-owner’s rights. These legislative solutions 
could not only save millions of dollars in litigation over the effects 
of voluntary units and in unnecessary royalty and bonus payments, 
but could also make voluntary units a more attractive unitization 
option for operators, mineral servitude holders, and landowners 
alike. 
CONCLUSION 
The first amendment to the Mineral Code proposed by this 
Comment will clarify the method of voluntary unit creation. This 
proposal defines the extent of a voluntary unit’s effect by stating 
that a voluntary unit is effective only as to the parties who 
consented to the unitization agreement. The second proposal 
clarifies the law so that proportional interruption of servitudes may 
be accomplished through partial surface co-owner consent to a 
unitization. By employing two clarifying amendments to the 
Mineral Code, the Louisiana Legislature can avoid ambiguity in 
the law and prevent inconsistent and inequitable results for 
operators, lessees, surface owners, and mineral-right owners alike. 
Through the amendments, surface co-owners will be prevented 
from trampling on each other’s interests in the unitization context, 
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taking a potential source of strife out of the co-ownership 
environment. 
The beneficial effects of the proportional interruption solution 
are well illustrated by the hypothetical scenario posed by Mike and 
Kate’s surface co-ownership, Bob’s mineral servitude, and Black 
Gold’s voluntary unit. Kate and Mike have a difference of opinion. 
Mike wishes to avoid the inconvenience and environmental and 
aesthetic damage posed by oil and gas exploration on his land and 
receive some consideration for the inclusion of his interest in the 
voluntary unit. Additionally, Mike sees his resistance as futile 
because he thinks Black Gold will simply seek a compulsory unit 
if he does not consent. Kate, on the other hand, believes that there 
will not be good faith drilling or production on the tract or through 
a unit prior to the conclusion of the ten-year prescriptive period on 
Bob’s servitude. Thus, she does not consent. Through the use of 
the proportional approach, Mike’s consent to the voluntary unit 
remains effective against the servitude burdening his co-ownership 
interest, Kate’s minority ownership is unaffected, Bob’s servitude 
may be partially preserved through unit drilling, and Black Gold 
maintains a voluntary unit over the tract in proportion to Mike’s 
ownership interest. The adoption of the proportional approach 
through these amendments is the only way forward that protects 
and enhances each involved party’s interests and encourages the 
use of voluntary unitizations to efficiently explore for minerals in 
Louisiana. Who knows? Maybe in the end it will be just a little 
“more fun to share with everyone.” 
 
W. Drew Burnham 
  
                                                                                                             
 * J.D./D.C.L., 2015, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. 
I would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau, Professor Patrick Ottinger, 
McClain Schonekas, and Minia Bremenstul for their encouragement and advice 
in the construction of this Comment. This product would not have been possible 
without their tireless efforts. 
 
 
